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This paper examines the effect of exogenous shocks to savings on world capital markets.  Using the
exogenous shocks to US tax policy identified by Romer & Romer, we trace the impact of an exogenous
shock to savings through the income accounting identities of the US and the rest of the world.  We
find that exogenous tax increases are only partially offset by changes in private savings (Ricardian
equivalence is not complete).  We also find that only a small amount of the resulting change in US
saving is absorbed by increased domestic investment (contrary to Feldstein & Horioka). Almost half
of the fiscal shock is transmitted abroad as an increase in the US current account.  Positive shocks
to US savings generate current account deficits and increases in investment in other countries in the
world.  We cannot reject that the shock is uniformly transmitted across countries with different currency
regimes and different levels of development.  The results suggest highly integrated world capital markets
with rapid adjustment.  In short we find that the US acts like a large open economy and the world acts















Recent discussions of a global savings glut suggest that a surge in savings in one
country can have impacts across the globe.1 We wish to examine what happens
when a dollar of savings is added to world capital markets. If we treat the world
as a closed economy, undergraduate macroeconomics suggests that an exogenous
increase in savings results in an increase in investment of equal size. Is this evident
in the data? Do all countries in the world see an increase in investment or are some
countries cut oﬀ from shocks to world capital markets?
In this paper we exploit a series of exogenous shocks to US ﬁscal policy identiﬁed
by Romer and Romer (2009b) as a starting point to examine the impact of a shock
to world savings. The Romer shocks are useful because they use analysis of the
legislative record to identify tax changes that were unrelated to contemporaneous
economic conditions. The path from a change in US tax policy to world savings
requires examining a number of interesting questions. Do US tax changes aﬀect
aggregate savings in the US? Are changes in US savings exported abroad or does
all adjustment occur domestically?
The analysis in this paper is grounded in the national income accounting iden-
tities of the United States and the rest of the world. By deﬁnition,
Y = C(Y − T) + I + G + CA (1)
where output, Y , is assumed to be determined by the natural rate of output, con-
sumption, C, is a function of disposable income, investment, I, is a function of
the interest rate in world capital markets, G is government spending, and CA is
the current account. Savings is what is left over after the private sector and the
government consume.
S = Y − C(Y − T) − G (2)
The relationship between the current account, saving, and investment is
CA = S − I. (3)
1See Bernanke (2007) for a discussion of the global savings glut hypothesis. The argument
posited that an oversupply of savings - particularly in Emerging Asia - helped generate a US
current account Deﬁcit as the savings had to ﬂow somewhere, and the US was the willing recipient
of the savings.
2We wish to trace the impact of exogenous changes in taxes through these ac-
counting identities. Equation (2) shows that a change to taxes will aﬀect savings
through private consumption. If agents assume that tax changes are permanent,
standard models of consumption suggest that a tax increase will result in decreased
consumption and increased national savings.
Barro (1974) suggests that forward looking taxpayers take into account the gov-
ernment’s long run budget constraint and therefore do not respond to tax changes
that are unaccompanied by changes in government spending.2 We will refer to this
private savings response as Ricardian Equivalence for the remainder of the paper.
If Ricardian equivalence holds perfectly, tax shocks will be perfectly absorbed by
changes to private savings and there will be no impact on national savings. Thus,
we need to test whether national savings in the US is aﬀected by the tax shocks.
Second, are shocks to US national savings transmitted across borders? Equation
(3) shows that changes to savings must appear either as domestic investment shifts
or changes to the current account. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) ﬁnd that savings
and investment tend to be highly correlated across countries.3 If US savings and
investment comove perfectly, the shock to US saving will be absorbed domestically
and not transmitted across the border.
These two questions combine to determine whether we observe “twin deﬁcits.”
Are budget deﬁcits linked with current account deﬁcits? If we see an impact of US
tax shocks on the US current account, this signals that neither Ricardian equivalence
nor Feldstein-Horioka are fully operational and there is some truth to the view of
twin deﬁcits.
Once we establish that exogenous shocks to US savings are transmitted abroad
through the US current account we can begin to take accounting identities seriously
at the world level. Barring trade with Mars, a shock to the US current account
must generate an equal and opposite shock to the aggregate current account of the
rest of the world. Equation (3) tells us that these current account shocks must be
accompanied by changes in saving or investment in the rest of the world.
We ﬁnd that exogenous tax policy changes in the US have a signiﬁcant impact on
2Also see Barro (1989). Ricardian Equivalence has generated a considerable literature since
Barro’s initial article. See Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) and Seater (1993) for some details of the
debate.
3This result has been updated countless times. See Coakley, Kulasi and Smith (1998). Obstfeld
and Taylor (2005) note that the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) correlation has been falling since
1970.
3investment in other countries over the period 1973 to 2005. When the US changes
tax policy for exogenous reasons, a substantial amount of that change in policy
is transmitted through changes in the current account to the rest of the world.
When the US government saves more, private citizens do save somewhat less, but
the impact on national savings is still positive. Further, domestic investment has a
relatively small response to an exogenous ﬁscal shock, so the majority of the change
in savings turns into a change in net lending to or borrowing from the rest of the
world.
Fiscal shocks in the US act as shocks to world savings. The response of the
rest of the world to these shocks appears to be well described by the simple closed
economy relationship S=I. An exogenous shock to world savings results in higher
investment around the globe. While there is some suggestion that the magnitude
of the response varies across currency regimes or levels of development, we cannot
reject that all countries have identical responses to the shocks. Interestingly, the
magnitude of the response seems to be unrelated to standard measures of openness
to capital ﬂows.
These results are consistent with a world where shocks to the world capital
market are transmitted to all countries and all countries share a similar elasticity of
investment with respect to the world interest rate. Every additional dollar of world
savings appears as an investment increase in each country in the world proportional
to their share of world GDP. This is consistent with short run equalization of capital
returns and is similar to the long run equalization to capital returns found in Caselli
and Feyrer (2007).
The results suggests that world capital markets are ﬂuid and reach into all coun-
tries in the world. Changes in saving in one country rapidly appear as investment
increases in all the rest of the countries in the globe. This is important for thinking
about the importance of East Asian savings over the last decade as well as for eval-
uating the impact of the large ﬁscal policy changes currently occurring in the large
economies in the world.
1 Previous Literature
Much of the literature on ﬁscal policy transmission rightly focuses on the impact of
such policy on the country that engages in the ﬁscal changes. Such work has included
4looking at episodes of defense budget expansion (Ramey (2006), etc.) to examine the
impact of ﬁscal changes on consumption and wages. This work tends to ﬁnd output
increases with a ﬁscal expansion, but consumption and real wages fall. Further
evidence is drawn from short run restriction identiﬁed vector autoregressions. This
work includes Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2007), and Mountford and
Uhlig (2008). In this work, output rises with a positive ﬁscal shock, but so do real
wages and consumption. The recent debate on the impact of ﬁscal policy has often
focused on this disagreement.
In our work, we take the changes in tax policy identiﬁed by Romer and Romer
(2009b) as exogenous to current economic conditions to be our ﬁscal shocks. Romer
and Romer (2009b) focus on the changes over time for the economy as a whole as
well as for investment and other outcomes following a ﬁscal shock. They ﬁnd that
tax increases which are purely exogenous to the economic setting are contractionary.
They focus on the dynamic response to tax shocks and see that GDP, Consumption
and Investment all fall in response to a tax increase, with the impact on Investment
building over time. In further work, they examine the response of govt expenditures
(Romer and Romer (2009a)). They ﬁnd that even in the long run, government
expenditures do not respond strongly to changes in taxes - the starve the beast
hypothesis does not hold. This result is important in the context of our work in
that it suggests changes in government taxes are not simply oﬀset by changes in
spending in which case there would have been no impact on government savings.
A number of studies have looked at the international transmission of ﬁscal shocks.
There are two main groups of this literature. First, some papers test the direct
impact of a ﬁscal shock in one country on the GDP of another’s. This literature is
testing the question of whether ﬁscal policy shocks can act as an “engine of growth”
for the rest of the world, or whether the shocks are primarily limited to the local
country (see B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e and Cimadomo (2006) and Arin and Koray (2005))
A second strand of the literature is more directly related to the twin deﬁcit
concept. This literature also relies on accounting identities to show that changes
in government savings should lead to changes in the current account. Work using
calibrations tends to support this view, but recent time series econometric evidence
has failed to ﬁnd such eﬀects. In particular, both Kim and Roubini (2008) and
Corsetti and Muller (2008) argue they ﬁnd evidence of twin divergence not twin
deﬁcits. That is, they ﬁnd that ﬁscal shocks identiﬁed through short run restrictions
5VARs (in the same manner as the bulk of the domestic literature) do not generate
twin deﬁcits, instead, budget deﬁcits lead to real exchange rate depreciations and
current account surpluses (or no impact). As Kim and Roubini (2008) note, the
change in government savings appears to go both to changes in private savings
and changes in investment (crowding out, consistent with Feldstein and Horioka
(1980)). Corsetti and Muller (2008) also examine evidence across countries to see if
the persistence of the shocks and openness of the economy aﬀect the transmission.
They ﬁnd that yes, such factors play a role and the US has relatively small levels of
international transmission of shocks based on its relatively closed economy.
Related work has considered both the twin deﬁcits and global savings glut ar-
guments. Chinn and Ito (2007) and Gruber and Kamin (2007) have explored the
broader determinants of current accounts. Both use panel analysis to determine
the root determinants of countries’ current account to GDP ratios. Chinn and Ito
(2007) are supportive of twin deﬁcits, ﬁnding coeﬃcients of between 0.2 and 0.5 on
the budget deﬁcit. Gruber and Kamin (2007) ﬁnd a coeﬃcient of 0.09 on the ﬁscal
balance. Neither study has exogenous variation to identify the impact of a ﬁscal
change, but instead rely on cross-country diﬀerences. Also, both are examining
medium term determinants, using ﬁve year averages in the panel.
Given that savings in one country can aﬀect investment in another and vice
versa, barring any exogenous variation, it is diﬃcult for these studies to directly
estimate a global savings glut relationship. Instead, they look to see if East Asia
saves more than expected and the US less. Gruber and Kamin (2007) argue Asia
does save too much currently, but that this can be explained as a reaction to the
East Asian crisis. Chinn and Ito (2007) also argue there is too much savings in Asia
but note this does not appear to be due to a lack of ﬁnancial development. Both
papers argue it is unclear why so much of this savings would ﬂow to the US.
The results which are skeptical of twin deﬁcits contrast with a ﬁnding in Romer
and Romer (2009b). At the end of their paper, Romer and Romer examine the
impact of a tax change on exports and imports. They ﬁnd that exports increase
and imports decrease, which they view as consistent with a tax increase leading to
a drop in interest rates and hence reducing capital inﬂows. But, they argue, the
drop in imports may simply be more consistent with a fall in income rather than
any open economy eﬀects.
We take this observation as a starting point to explore the impact of a change
6in government savings in one country on both the current account and investment
in other countries. Our paper is unique in bringing diﬀerent evidence to bear than
most explorations of twin deﬁcits: exogenous ﬁscal shocks matching actual policy
changes. We ﬁnd that there is in fact evidence along the lines a twin deﬁcit theory
would predict: changes in government savings are correlated with changes in the
current account. Thus, we can look at exogenous shocks to taxes in the United
States as exogenous shocks to savings available to the rest of the world. The next
section explains those shocks and how we examine the eﬀects. We further expand
the literature by looking not just at the current account of the country with the
change, but also by examining where the increased savings goes around the world.
Thus, the paper makes an important contribution to the literature studying how
changes in savings in one country aﬀect other countries.
2 Methodology
We borrow the shocks from Romer and Romer (2009b). The construction of the
shocks is described in more detail in Romer and Romer (2008). They use legislative
history to separate out tax changes that were made based on attempts to respond
to current economic situations from those that are exogenous to current economic
conditions. Such changes may be motivated by a desire to raise taxes in an eﬀort
to restore long run budgetary balance or to cut taxes to lower marginal rates and
possibly spur long run economic growth. Crucially, the changes are not aimed
at smoothing short run business cycle ﬂuctuations. Examples include changes in
social security tax rates aimed at long run balance, tax cuts motivated by a shift
in governing ideology, or tax increases aimed at long run budget balance. Romer
and Romer argue such changes are exogenous to current or anticipated economic
situations. There is, for example, no relationship between the shocks and lagged
GDP growth in the US (see Figure 1).
The exogeneity is crucial to the Romer and Romer examination of the domestic
eﬀects of tax changes. It is also crucial to our investigation of the impact of those
changes on US savings, investment, and the current account. Even if one worries that
there is some component of endogeneity in these shocks, when we examine overseas
responses, the changes are even more clearly exogenous. The shocks are in no way
responses to changes in savings, investment, or general economic circumstances in
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other countries.
We limit ourselves to those shocks in the post Bretton Woods era of the interna-
tional economy. Our reason is that changes in the international ﬁnancial architecture
over time arguably make looking at the international economic transmission prior
to that time less informative for more recent experiences. Further, we begin to lose
data on current accounts, investment, and other necessary variables for an increas-
ing number of countries as we expand back before the 1970’s. Thus our sample
runs from 1973 to 2005. For the regression on the current account, the dataset
is an unbalanced panel of 113 countries. The investment data is somewhat more
limiting with only 106 countries. For the current account, Kuwait has changes that
are greater than aggregate GDP for several years around the Gulf War. For this
reason, we exclude Kuwait from the data set.
We explore the impact of the Romer shocks on US variables, rest of world vari-
ables summed together, and in panels for individual country/year observations. We
examine the data in terms of changes divided by GDP. That is, when we look at
the current account, we examine the change in the current account divided by the
previous year’s GDP. The advantage of scaling to GDP rather than simply using
raw dollar amounts and controlling for GDP is that when we turn to the eﬀects
in other countries, we do not have to convert investment into a common currency.
8Instead, we can scale by local GDP.4
By using lagged GDP to scale the changes we are implicitly assuming that GDP
is unchanged by the shocks. Romer and Romer (2009b) ﬁnd that the impact on
output is quite small in the ﬁrst three quarters after the shock. Assuming no output
movement is therefore a reasonable assumption during the year of the tax change
which is our period of interest. More importantly, output eﬀects are likely to bias
us against ﬁnding external eﬀects of US tax changes. If output falls with a tax
increase, private savings should decrease such that national savings will increase by
less than if there were no output response. The same bias will hold for the impact
of the shocks on non US GDP, and foreign GDP is even less likely to respond to the
shocks than domestic GDP.5
The shocks themselves are in Billions of US dollars and are changes in tax policy.
That is, a permanent reduction in taxes by 100 Billion dollars in 1985 would show
up as a shock of -100 Billion in 1985 and zero thereafter. Thus, we are interested
in the change in the current account (or investment) in a given year. Romer and
Romer (2009b) typically use a dynamic speciﬁcation examining the impact of policy
changes over time. We lack adequate quarterly data for many countries to exploit
their series higher frequency and use annual data, removing part of the interest in
ﬂuctuations over time. More importantly, our view is that of an accounting identity.
We are curious where the changes in savings in a given year go. If the government
saves more in a given year, where does that money go in that given year. For ease
of comparison across countries and time, we scale the shocks as well as the changes
in the current account and investment by GDP.
3 Results
3.1 Aggregate Results
Figure 2 shows the crucial motivating fact. The bars represent the exogenous shocks
to US ﬁscal policy identiﬁed by Romer and Romer (2009b). The two lines show
4The current account data are in current dollars and the change is expressed as a percentage
of lagged current dollar GDP. Investment data are real dollars and the change is expressed as a
percentage of lagged real GDP. All data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
5If GDP responds contemporaneously a US tax increase would reduce world aggregate demand
and drive down investment in the rest of the world. This would bias against ﬁnding that US tax
increases generate investment increases elsewhere.
9Figure 2: Changes in the US and Rest of World Current Accounts in Response to
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changes in the US current account and changes in the summation of the current
accounts for the rest of the world. In order to maintain consistency with the tables
in the rest of the paper, all changes and shocks are scaled to the level of non-US
world GDP. For the purpose of this graph, the important fact is that the relative
magnitudes are the same for the shock and for the current account changes.
Exogenous changes in US ﬁscal policy track reasonably closely with changes in
the size of the US current account. The simple correlation between the ﬁscal shocks
and changes to the US current account is 0.28. The correlation between the shocks
and changes to the rest of the world’s current account is -0.36. Trade with Mars
appears to play a small role and the correlation between the movements in the US
current account and the rest of the world’s current account is -0.76.
Table 1 illustrates the basic facts from Figure 2 more formally. We regress the
change in the current account divided by lagged GDP on the shock measured as
a percentage of GDP. The regressions are run with Newey-West standard errors to
control for possible serial correlation in the time series.6 For the current account,
6As it turns out Newey-West standard errors, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors, and
OLS estimated standard errors are all nearly identical. There is very little autocorrelation in either
10Table 1: The Eﬀect of Exogenous Shocks to US Fiscal Policy on the Current Account
and Investment in the US and the Rest of the World (ROW)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
US CA US Inv ROW CA ROW CA ROW CA-IV
Fiscal Shock / US GDP 0.466* 0.166
(0.190) (0.327)
US CA -0.764** -1.260**
(0.132) (0.454)




Observations 32 29 32 32 32
R-squared 0.317
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Standard errors corrected for serial correlation.
the expected change in any given time period is zero so a constant is omitted.
For investment, aggregate GDP growth causes growth over time, so a constant is
included.7 Equation (4) shows the simple estimating equation.
yt = α + β ∗ Shockt + ǫ (4)
What coeﬃcients should we expect to see for the US regressions in Table 1? If
the US were a small open economy and government spending, private savings, and
investment within the US were completely unresponsive to exogenous ﬁscal shocks
we would expect these shocks to translate one for one into changes in the US current
account. This suggests that we should see a coeﬃcient of one in column (1) and a
coeﬃcient of zero in column (2).
However, for the response of investment we must remember that the US is not
a small open economy. In a typical year in our sample, US GDP is roughly 25%
of total world output. A substantial portion of the shock to US savings should
therefore show up in US investment even if there were no strong tendency of savings
and investment to move together (as suggested by Feldstein and Horioka (1980)).
In fact, if capital were perfectly mobile and all countries had identical elasticities
the shocks or the changes in the current account.
7Results including a constant in all regressions are available on request. The diﬀerence from
the reported results is quite small.
11of investment to movements in the common world interest rate, we would expect
the US investment increase to be proportional to the US share of world GDP.8
The benchmark for the coeﬃcient in the investment regression should therefore be
roughly 0.25. This in turn suggests that the benchmark for the response of the
current account in column (1) is 0.75 rather than one.
Column (1) shows the response of the US current account to an exogenous ﬁscal
shock. The coeﬃcient of 0.466 indicates that for every dollar increase in US taxes
collected, almost half moves to the rest of the world economy through an increase
in the US current account. Column (2) shows the response of US investment to the
ﬁscal shocks. For every 1 dollar increase in US taxes collected there is a 17 cent
increase in investment in the US.9
In neither case can we reject our benchmarks of 0.75 for the current account and
0.25 for investment. The investment coeﬃcient is not precisely estimated, so the
conﬁdence interval allows for some degree of saving-investment correlation along the
lines of Feldstein and Horioka. However, the point estimates suggest no eﬀect. The
current account coeﬃcient is somewhat less than 0.75 and the investment coeﬃcient
suggests that this is not due to correlation between savings and investment. This is
consistent with some degree of Ricardian Equivalence. The point estimates suggest
that for every dollar of tax increase, about one third of the tax increase is oﬀset by
a decrease in private savings. Of the remaining 67 cents, roughly 17 is invested in
the US and the rest, or roughly half the shock, is transmitted abroad.10
Columns (3) through (5) examine the response of the current account in the rest
of the world to shocks originating in the US. The left hand side in these regression
is the change in the sum of the value of the current accounts for all countries except
the US expressed as a percentage of aggregate GDP summed across all countries
except the US. In other words it is the change in the value of the non US current
account as a percentage of non US GDP.
In order to aid in interpreting the coeﬃcients, the right hand side variables are
also scaled as a proportion of non US GDP. For example, Column (3) examines the
8This fact that savings and investment should be more highly correlated in large open economies
has been noted in the literature going back to Feldstein and Horioka (1980). See Coakley et al.
(1998) for a more complete discussion.
9Romer and Romer (2009b) ﬁnd that a tax increase is coincident with a drop in investment
over time. The contemporaneous eﬀect is close to zero. We are using data set only from 1973
forward at the annual frequency, so the slightly diﬀerent result is not surprising.
10The 17 cents that show up as domestic investment is almost exactly 25 percent of the savings
change, matching the US share of world income.
12response of the rest of the world’s current account to changes in the US current
account. The change in the US current account is measured as a percentage of
non-US aggregate GDP. As long as the sum of the current accounts of all countries
in the world is zero (no trade with Mars) this coeﬃcient should be exactly negative
one. If the US current account increases by 1 percent of non US GDP, we would
expect the non US current account to decrease by 1 percent as a percentage of non
US GDP. The actual estimate is -0.76. The coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the one percent level and is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from negative 1.
Column (4) examines the eﬀect of the ﬁscal shock on the rest of the world’s
current account. The ﬁscal shock is also scaled as a percentage of non US GDP. In
this case we do not expect a coeﬃcient of negative one since not all of the shock will
cross the US border. As we discuss above, the largest response (in absolute value)
that we expect to see is 0.75, and column (1) suggests that only half of the ﬁscal
shock appears as an increase in world savings. Assuming that column (1) is well
estimated and that there are no other eﬀects of a US ﬁscal shock we should expect
the coeﬃcient in column (4) to be negative and of the same size as the coeﬃcient in
column (1). The estimate of -0.643 is larger in absolute value than the column (1)
estimate and smaller than our theoretical benchmark and insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from neither. We can strongly reject a zero coeﬃcient or no response.
Finally, we can use the ﬁscal shock as an instrument to establish that exogenous
changes in the US current account results in equal and opposite changes in the
current account in the rest of the world. Column (5) regresses the non US current
account response to a change in the US current account where the US current
account change in instrumented with the Romer and Romer exogenous ﬁscal shocks.
In this case, accounting identities would once again suggest a coeﬃcient of negative
one. The point estimate is larger (in absolute value) than one, but unity is well
within the conﬁdence interval, and once again, we can safely reject no eﬀect.
The results of Table 1 suggest that exogenous shocks to US ﬁscal policy act as a
shock to world savings. There is a statistically signiﬁcant and economically sensible
response of the rest of the world’s current account to a US tax law change. A one
dollar increase in US taxes results in a 47 cent shock to the US current account
representing an exogenous shock to world savings. This increase in world savings
shows up as a current account surplus for all other countries in the world.
133.2 Disaggregated Results
What impact does a increase in world savings have on a typical country? Suppose
that our benchmark is to think of the world as comprised of countries that rely on
a common pool of savings and respond to a common world interest rate. At the
world level, savings must equal investment, so shocks to world savings should result
in increased investment through lower world interest rates. As long as investment
decisions in individual countries are determined by the world interest rate, we should
expect to see all countries in the world respond to shocks to world savings. If we
further assume that countries borrow from abroad at the margin and share similar
elasticities of investment with regard to the world interest rate we should expect to
see a proportionally similar response across all countries. Even if countries insulate
themselves from the world interest rate to some extent via capital controls or have
diﬀerent levels of nominal interest rates due to diﬀerent inﬂation rates and expected
changes in exchange rates, as long as the shock to world savings and hence world
interest rates has an impact at the margin of their capital market, we should see
some response.
In the tables to follow we move from aggregate results to individual country
results. One advantage is to allow us to scale local investment by local GDP and
not have to sum investment across countries (which involves ﬁnding plausible inter-
nationally comparable investment price indices). For the initial results, we include
results where observations are weighted by country size. In these cases, the re-
gressions are similar to the aggregated regressions from the previous section. This
has the advantage of scaling the coeﬃcients to conform to the accounting identities
discussed earlier. A one dollar shock to the US current account should show up
as a one dollar shock to the rest of the world’s current account. The downside to
this approach is that the response of large countries will dominate the results. For
the non-weighted regressions each country is taken as an individual experiment, in-
creasing the power of the regressions. This will also allow us to examine sub-groups
of countries for diﬀerential responses. Do open countries respond to a world sav-
ing shock diﬀerently than closed countries? Does the currency regime aﬀect the
response to shocks? Do shocks diﬀer over levels of development?
Table 2 shows the results from our country level regressions. Figures 3 and 4
show the corresponding partial scatterplots of the residual changes in the current
14account and investment versus the residual of the US ﬁscal shocks.11 The regression
equation being estimated is similar to equation (4) with the addition of country ﬁxed
eﬀects made possible by the panel structure of the data. The country level eﬀects
are only included in the regressions on changes to investment. Because of GDP
growth, the change in investment as a percentage of GDP is positive on average and
will vary by country based on the growth rate of aggregate GDP. The country eﬀects
control for this heterogeneity. In the case of the current account, our accounting
identities suggest that the expected growth rate for any arbitrary observation is
zero. In leaving out country eﬀects and a constant we are essentially imposing
this moment condition on the current account regressions.12 In all cases standard
errors are clustered by year to account for the fact that the shock is identical for all
countries in any given year.13
yit = β ∗ Shockit + γi + ǫ (5)
As in Table 1 we expect a coeﬃcient of between -0.47 and -0.75 on the cur-
rent account. If smaller countries typically respond more, the coeﬃcient on the
unweighted regressions will tend to be larger, with the weighted regressions more
directly corresponding to the aggregated results.
The unweighted regression has a clearly larger coeﬃcient and the size implies
that when the US increases taxes by one percent of world GDP, the typical country
sees a current account response in excess of one percent of its GDP, though one
percent is in the conﬁdence interval. For the weighted regressions, the responses are
directly between -0.47 and -0.75 and -0.47 is well within the conﬁdence interval. For
both the weighted and unweighted regressions, zero eﬀect is strongly rejected.
The expected coeﬃcient on investment is less certain. If we believe other coun-
tries current accounts must respond to a change in the US current account simply
due to an adding up constraint, the open question is whether the change in the cur-
11The coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance levels do not change as we eliminate outliers to zoom in on a
more visible relationship in the bottom half of the ﬁgures.
12The results do not change substantially if we include a full set of country dummies. When
included, the estimate for the constant are small and typically insigniﬁcant.
13The other potential standard error complication is serial correlation. The aggregate results
suggest that this is not a signiﬁcant issue. Clustering on the country level rather than the year
level yields much lower standard errors. Using multilevel clustering on both year and country (as
described in Cameron, Gelbach, Miller, Hall and Drive (2006)) yields standard errors that are very
similar to just clustering by year.























ARG1977 ARG1978 ARG1979 ARG1980 ARG1981 ARG1982 ARG1983 ARG1984 ARG1985 ARG1986 ARG1987 ARG1988 ARG1989 ARG1990
ARG1991 ARG1992 ARG1993 ARG1994 ARG1995 ARG1996 ARG1997 ARG1998 ARG1999 ARG2000 ARG2001 ARG2002 ARG2003 ARG2004 ARG2005 AUS1974 AUS1975 AUS1976 AUS1977 AUS1978 AUS1979 AUS1980 AUS1981 AUS1982 AUS1983 AUS1984 AUS1985 AUS1986 AUS1987 AUS1988 AUS1989 AUS1990 AUS1991 AUS1992 AUS1993 AUS1994 AUS1995 AUS1996 AUS1997 AUS1998 AUS1999 AUS2000 AUS2001 AUS2002 AUS2003 AUS2004 AUS2005 AUT1974 AUT1975 AUT1976 AUT1977 AUT1978 AUT1979 AUT1980 AUT1981 AUT1982 AUT1983 AUT1984 AUT1985 AUT1986 AUT1987 AUT1988 AUT1989 AUT1990 AUT1991 AUT1992 AUT1993 AUT1994 AUT1995 AUT1996 AUT1997 AUT1998 AUT1999 AUT2000 AUT2001 AUT2002 AUT2003 AUT2004 AUT2005 BDI1986 BDI1987 BDI1988 BDI1989
BDI1990 BDI1991 BDI1992 BDI1993 BDI1994 BDI1995 BDI1996
BDI1997
BDI1998
BDI1999 BDI2000 BDI2001 BDI2002 BDI2003
BDI2004
BDI2005










BEN1997 BEN1998 BEN1999 BEN2000 BEN2001 BEN2002 BEN2003 BEN2004 BFA1975
BFA1976 BFA1977 BFA1978 BFA1979 BFA1980 BFA1981 BFA1982 BFA1983 BFA1984 BFA1985 BFA1986 BFA1987 BFA1988 BFA1989
BFA1990 BFA1991 BFA1992 BFA1993 BFA1994 BFA2001 BGD1977 BGD1978 BGD1979 BGD1980 BGD1981 BGD1982 BGD1983 BGD1984 BGD1985 BGD1986 BGD1987 BGD1988 BGD1989 BGD1990 BGD1991 BGD1992 BGD1993 BGD1994 BGD1995 BGD1996 BGD1997 BGD1998 BGD1999 BGD2000 BGD2001 BGD2002 BGD2003 BGD2004 BGD2005 BHR1981 BHR1982
BHR1983







BHR1994 BHR1995 BHR1996 BHR1997 BHR1998
BHR1999 BHR2000
BHR2001 BHR2002 BHR2003 BHR2004 BHR2005
BHS1977 BHS1978 BHS1979 BHS1980 BHS1981 BHS1982 BHS1983 BHS1984 BHS1985 BHS1986 BHS1987 BHS1988 BHS1989 BHS1990 BHS1991
BHS1992 BHS1993 BHS1994 BHS1995 BHS1996 BHS1997 BHS1998
BHS1999




BOL1983 BOL1984 BOL1985 BOL1986 BOL1987 BOL1988 BOL1989 BOL1990 BOL1991 BOL1992 BOL1993 BOL1994
BOL1995 BOL1996 BOL1997 BOL1998 BOL1999 BOL2000 BOL2001 BOL2002 BOL2003 BOL2004 BOL2005 BRA1976 BRA1977 BRA1978 BRA1979 BRA1980 BRA1981 BRA1982 BRA1983 BRA1984 BRA1985 BRA1986 BRA1987 BRA1988 BRA1989 BRA1990 BRA1991 BRA1992 BRA1993 BRA1994 BRA1995 BRA1996 BRA1997 BRA1998 BRA1999 BRA2000 BRA2001 BRA2002 BRA2003 BRA2004 BRA2005 BRB1974 BRB1975 BRB1976
BRB1977 BRB1978 BRB1979 BRB1980
BRB1981
BRB1982




BRB1995 BRB1996 BRB1997 BRB1998 BRB1999 BRB2000 BRB2001 BRB2002 BRB2003 BRB2004 BRB2005 CAF1978 CAF1979 CAF1980
CAF1981
CAF1982 CAF1983 CAF1984 CAF1985 CAF1986 CAF1987 CAF1988 CAF1989 CAF1990 CAF1991 CAF1992 CAF1993 CAF1994 CAN1974 CAN1975 CAN1976 CAN1977 CAN1978 CAN1979 CAN1980 CAN1981 CAN1982 CAN1983 CAN1984 CAN1985 CAN1986 CAN1987 CAN1988 CAN1989 CAN1990 CAN1991 CAN1992 CAN1993 CAN1994 CAN1995 CAN1996 CAN1997 CAN1998 CAN1999 CAN2000 CAN2001 CAN2002 CAN2003 CAN2004 CAN2005 CHE1978 CHE1979 CHE1980 CHE1981 CHE1982 CHE1983 CHE1984 CHE1985 CHE1986 CHE1987 CHE1988 CHE1989 CHE1990 CHE1991 CHE1992 CHE1993 CHE1994 CHE1995 CHE1996 CHE1997 CHE1998 CHE1999 CHE2000 CHE2001 CHE2002 CHE2003 CHE2004 CHE2005
CHL1976
CHL1977 CHL1978 CHL1979 CHL1980 CHL1981
CHL1982 CHL1983
CHL1984




CIV1985 CIV1986 CIV1987 CIV1988 CIV1989 CIV1990 CIV1991 CIV1992 CIV1993 CIV1994
CIV1995
CIV1996 CIV1997 CIV1998 CIV1999 CIV2000 CIV2001 CIV2002
CIV2003 CIV2004 CIV2005 CMR1978 CMR1979 CMR1980 CMR1981 CMR1982 CMR1983 CMR1984 CMR1985 CMR1986 CMR1987 CMR1988 CMR1989 CMR1990 CMR1991 CMR1992 CMR1993 CMR1994 CMR1995 CMR1996 CMR1997 CMR1998
CMR1999 CMR2001 CMR2002 CMR2003 COL1974 COL1975 COL1976 COL1977 COL1978 COL1979 COL1980 COL1981 COL1982 COL1983 COL1984 COL1985 COL1986 COL1987 COL1988 COL1989 COL1990 COL1991 COL1992 COL1993 COL1994 COL1995 COL1996 COL1997 COL1998 COL1999 COL2000 COL2001 COL2002 COL2003 COL2004 COL2005 CRI1978 CRI1979 CRI1980 CRI1981 CRI1982 CRI1983 CRI1984 CRI1985 CRI1986 CRI1987 CRI1988 CRI1989 CRI1990 CRI1991
CRI1992 CRI1993 CRI1994 CRI1995 CRI1996 CRI1997 CRI1998 CRI1999 CRI2000 CRI2001 CRI2002 CRI2003 CRI2004 CRI2005
CYP1977 CYP1978 CYP1979 CYP1980 CYP1981 CYP1982 CYP1983 CYP1984 CYP1985 CYP1986 CYP1987 CYP1988 CYP1989 CYP1990 CYP1991 CYP1992
CYP1993
CYP1994 CYP1995 CYP1996 CYP1997 CYP1998
CYP1999 CYP2000 CYP2001 CYP2002 CYP2003 CYP2004 CYP2005 DEU1974 DEU1975 DEU1976 DEU1977 DEU1978 DEU1979 DEU1980 DEU1981 DEU1982 DEU1983 DEU1984 DEU1985 DEU1986 DEU1987 DEU1988 DEU1989 DEU1990 DEU1991 DEU1992 DEU1993 DEU1994 DEU1995 DEU1996 DEU1997 DEU1998 DEU1999 DEU2000 DEU2001 DEU2002 DEU2003 DEU2004 DEU2005 DNK1976 DNK1977 DNK1978 DNK1979 DNK1980 DNK1981 DNK1982 DNK1983 DNK1984 DNK1985 DNK1986 DNK1987 DNK1988 DNK1989 DNK1990 DNK1991 DNK1992 DNK1993 DNK1994 DNK1995 DNK1996 DNK1997 DNK1998 DNK1999 DNK2000 DNK2001 DNK2002 DNK2003 DNK2004 DNK2005 DOM1974
DOM1975 DOM1976 DOM1977 DOM1978 DOM1979 DOM1980




DOM1993 DOM1994 DOM1995 DOM1996 DOM1997 DOM1998 DOM1999 DOM2000 DOM2001 DOM2002
DOM2003 DOM2004 DOM2005 DZA1978
DZA1979 DZA1980 DZA1981 DZA1982 DZA1983 DZA1984 DZA1985 DZA1986




ECU1988 ECU1989 ECU1990 ECU1991
ECU1992
ECU1993 ECU1994 ECU1995 ECU1996 ECU1997 ECU1998
ECU1999
ECU2000




EGY1984 EGY1985 EGY1986 EGY1987 EGY1988 EGY1989
EGY1990 EGY1991 EGY1992 EGY1993 EGY1994 EGY1995 EGY1996 EGY1997 EGY1998 EGY1999 EGY2000 EGY2001 EGY2002 EGY2003 EGY2004 EGY2005 ESP1976 ESP1977 ESP1978 ESP1979 ESP1980 ESP1981 ESP1982 ESP1983 ESP1984 ESP1985 ESP1986 ESP1987 ESP1988 ESP1989 ESP1990 ESP1991 ESP1992 ESP1993 ESP1994 ESP1995 ESP1996 ESP1997 ESP1998 ESP1999 ESP2000 ESP2001 ESP2002 ESP2003 ESP2004 ESP2005 ETH1982 ETH1983 ETH1984 ETH1985 ETH1986 ETH1987 ETH1988 ETH1989 ETH1990 ETH1991 ETH1992 ETH1993 ETH1994 ETH1995 ETH1996 ETH1997 ETH1998 ETH1999 ETH2000
ETH2001 ETH2002 ETH2003 ETH2004 ETH2005
FIN1976 FIN1977 FIN1978 FIN1979 FIN1980 FIN1981 FIN1982 FIN1983 FIN1984 FIN1985 FIN1986 FIN1987 FIN1988 FIN1989 FIN1990 FIN1991 FIN1992 FIN1993 FIN1994 FIN1995 FIN1996 FIN1997 FIN1998 FIN1999 FIN2000 FIN2001 FIN2002 FIN2003 FIN2004 FIN2005 FJI1980
FJI1981
FJI1982 FJI1983 FJI1984 FJI1985 FJI1986 FJI1987 FJI1988
FJI1989 FJI1990
FJI1991 FJI1992 FJI1993 FJI1994 FJI1995 FJI1996
FJI1997 FJI1998 FJI1999 FRA1976 FRA1977 FRA1978 FRA1979 FRA1980 FRA1981 FRA1982 FRA1983 FRA1984 FRA1985 FRA1986 FRA1987 FRA1988 FRA1989 FRA1990 FRA1991 FRA1992 FRA1993 FRA1994 FRA1995 FRA1996 FRA1997 FRA1998 FRA1999 FRA2000 FRA2001 FRA2002 FRA2003 FRA2004 FRA2005










GAB2003 GAB2004 GBR1974 GBR1975 GBR1976 GBR1977 GBR1978 GBR1979 GBR1980 GBR1981 GBR1982 GBR1983 GBR1984 GBR1985 GBR1986 GBR1987 GBR1988 GBR1989 GBR1990 GBR1991 GBR1992 GBR1993 GBR1994 GBR1995 GBR1996 GBR1997 GBR1998 GBR1999 GBR2000 GBR2001 GBR2002 GBR2003 GBR2004 GBR2005 GHA1976 GHA1977 GHA1978 GHA1979 GHA1980 GHA1981
GHA1982
GHA1983 GHA1984 GHA1985 GHA1986 GHA1987 GHA1988 GHA1989 GHA1990 GHA1991 GHA1992 GHA1993 GHA1994 GHA1995 GHA1996 GHA1997 GHA1998 GHA1999




GIN1989 GIN1990 GIN1991 GIN1992 GIN1993
































GUY1997 GUY1998 GUY1999 GUY2000 GUY2001 GUY2002 GUY2003 GUY2004
GUY2005
HKG1999 HKG2000 HKG2001 HKG2002 HKG2003 HKG2004 HKG2005 HND1975 HND1976 HND1977 HND1978 HND1979 HND1980 HND1981 HND1982 HND1983 HND1984 HND1985 HND1986 HND1987 HND1988 HND1989 HND1990 HND1991 HND1992 HND1993 HND1994 HND1995 HND1996 HND1997 HND1998 HND1999 HND2000 HND2001 HND2002 HND2003 HND2004 HND2005 HTI1974 HTI1975 HTI1976 HTI1977 HTI1978 HTI1979 HTI1980 HTI1981 HTI1982 HTI1983 HTI1984 HTI1985 HTI1986 HTI1987 HTI1988 HTI1989 HTI1990 HTI1991 HTI1992 HTI1993 HTI1994 HTI1995 HTI1996 HTI1997 HTI1998 HTI1999 HTI2000 HTI2001 HTI2002 HTI2003 HTI2004 HTI2005 IDN1982 IDN1983 IDN1984 IDN1985 IDN1986 IDN1987 IDN1988 IDN1989 IDN1990 IDN1991 IDN1992 IDN1993 IDN1994 IDN1995 IDN1996 IDN1997 IDN1998 IDN1999 IDN2000 IDN2001 IDN2002 IDN2003 IDN2004 IDN2005 IND1976 IND1977 IND1978 IND1979 IND1980 IND1981 IND1982 IND1983 IND1984 IND1985 IND1986 IND1987 IND1988 IND1989 IND1990 IND1991 IND1992 IND1993 IND1994 IND1995 IND1996 IND1997 IND1998 IND1999 IND2000 IND2001 IND2002 IND2003 IRL1975
IRL1976 IRL1977 IRL1978 IRL1979





IRN1983 IRN1984 IRN1985 IRN1986 IRN1987 IRN1988 IRN1989 IRN1990
IRN1991
IRN1994
IRN1995 IRN1996 IRN1997 IRN1998
IRN1999 IRN2000 ISL1977 ISL1978 ISL1979 ISL1980 ISL1981 ISL1982
ISL1983
ISL1984 ISL1985 ISL1986
ISL1987 ISL1988 ISL1989 ISL1990 ISL1991 ISL1992 ISL1993 ISL1994 ISL1995 ISL1996 ISL1997 ISL1998 ISL1999 ISL2000
ISL2001 ISL2002
ISL2003 ISL2004 ISL2005 ISR1974
ISR1975
ISR1976 ISR1977 ISR1978 ISR1979 ISR1980 ISR1981 ISR1982 ISR1983 ISR1984 ISR1985
ISR1986
ISR1987
ISR1988 ISR1989 ISR1990 ISR1991 ISR1992 ISR1993 ISR1994 ISR1995 ISR1996 ISR1997 ISR1998 ISR1999 ISR2000 ISR2001 ISR2002 ISR2003 ISR2004 ISR2005 ITA1974 ITA1975 ITA1976 ITA1977 ITA1978 ITA1979 ITA1980 ITA1981 ITA1982 ITA1983 ITA1984 ITA1985 ITA1986 ITA1987 ITA1988 ITA1989 ITA1990 ITA1991 ITA1992 ITA1993 ITA1994 ITA1995 ITA1996 ITA1997 ITA1998 ITA1999 ITA2000 ITA2001 ITA2002 ITA2003 ITA2004 ITA2005
JAM1977




JAM1989 JAM1990 JAM1991 JAM1992
JAM1993
JAM1994
JAM1995 JAM1996 JAM1997 JAM1998 JAM1999 JAM2000 JAM2001 JAM2002 JAM2003 JAM2004
JAM2005 JOR1974 JOR1975 JOR1976 JOR1977
JOR1978
JOR1979 JOR1980





JOR1993 JOR1994 JOR1995 JOR1996 JOR1997 JOR1998 JOR1999
JOR2000 JOR2001 JOR2002 JOR2003
JOR2004 JOR2005




KEN1981 KEN1982 KEN1983 KEN1984 KEN1985 KEN1986 KEN1987 KEN1988 KEN1989 KEN1990 KEN1991 KEN1992 KEN1993 KEN1994 KEN1995
KEN1996 KEN1997 KEN1998 KEN1999 KEN2000 KEN2001 KEN2002 KEN2003 KEN2004 KEN2005 KOR1977 KOR1978 KOR1979 KOR1980 KOR1981 KOR1982 KOR1983 KOR1984 KOR1985 KOR1986 KOR1987 KOR1988 KOR1989 KOR1990 KOR1991 KOR1992 KOR1993 KOR1994 KOR1995 KOR1996 KOR1997 KOR1998
KOR1999 KOR2000 KOR2001 KOR2002 KOR2003 KOR2004 KOR2005 LAO1985 LAO1986 LAO1987 LAO1988 LAO1989 LAO1990 LAO1991 LAO1992 LAO1993
LAO1994 LAO1995 LAO1996 LAO1997 LAO1998 LAO1999








LBY1986 LBY1987 LBY1988 LBY1991
LBY1992
LBY1993









LKA1981 LKA1982 LKA1983 LKA1984













LSO1996 LSO1997 LSO1998 LSO1999 LSO2000 LSO2001
LSO2002 LSO2003 LSO2004 LSO2005 LUX1996 LUX1997 LUX1998 LUX1999 LUX2000
LUX2001
LUX2002 LUX2003 LUX2004 LUX2005
MAR1976 MAR1977
MAR1978 MAR1979 MAR1980 MAR1981 MAR1982 MAR1983 MAR1984 MAR1985 MAR1986 MAR1987 MAR1988 MAR1989 MAR1990 MAR1991 MAR1992 MAR1993 MAR1994 MAR1995 MAR1996 MAR1997 MAR1998 MAR1999 MAR2000 MAR2001 MAR2002 MAR2003 MAR2004 MAR2005 MDG1975 MDG1976 MDG1977 MDG1978
MDG1979
MDG1980
MDG1981 MDG1982 MDG1983 MDG1984 MDG1985 MDG1986 MDG1987 MDG1988 MDG1989
MDG1990 MDG1991 MDG1992 MDG1993 MDG1994 MDG1995 MDG1996 MDG1997 MDG1998 MDG1999 MDG2000 MDG2001 MDG2002 MDG2003 MDG2004 MDG2005 MEX1980 MEX1981 MEX1982 MEX1983 MEX1984 MEX1985 MEX1986 MEX1987
MEX1988 MEX1989 MEX1990 MEX1991 MEX1992 MEX1993 MEX1994 MEX1995 MEX1996 MEX1997 MEX1998 MEX1999 MEX2000 MEX2001 MEX2002 MEX2003 MEX2004 MEX2005 MLI1976 MLI1977
MLI1978






MLT1982 MLT1983 MLT1984 MLT1985 MLT1986 MLT1987 MLT1988 MLT1989 MLT1990 MLT1991 MLT1992 MLT1993 MLT1994 MLT1995 MLT1996 MLT1997 MLT1998 MLT1999
MLT2000
MLT2001 MLT2002







MRT1987 MRT1988 MRT1989 MRT1990 MRT1991 MRT1992 MRT1993
MRT1994 MRT1995 MRT1996 MRT1997 MRT1998 MUS1981
MUS1982 MUS1983 MUS1984 MUS1985
MUS1986
MUS1987 MUS1988 MUS1989 MUS1990 MUS1991 MUS1992 MUS1993 MUS1994

















MYS1980 MYS1981 MYS1982 MYS1983 MYS1984 MYS1985 MYS1986 MYS1987
MYS1988 MYS1989 MYS1990 MYS1991








NER1983 NER1984 NER1985 NER1986 NER1987 NER1988 NER1989 NER1990 NER1991 NER1992 NER1993 NER1994 NER1995 NER1996 NER1997 NER1998 NER1999 NER2000 NER2001 NER2002 NER2003 NER2004 NGA1978
NGA1979 NGA1980
NGA1981
NGA1982 NGA1983 NGA1984 NGA1985






















NIC2000 NIC2001 NIC2002 NIC2003 NIC2004 NIC2005 NLD1974 NLD1975 NLD1976 NLD1977 NLD1978 NLD1979 NLD1980 NLD1981 NLD1982 NLD1983 NLD1984 NLD1985 NLD1986 NLD1987 NLD1988 NLD1989 NLD1990 NLD1991 NLD1992 NLD1993 NLD1994 NLD1995 NLD1996 NLD1997 NLD1998 NLD1999 NLD2000 NLD2001 NLD2002 NLD2003 NLD2004 NLD2005 NOR1976 NOR1977
NOR1978 NOR1979 NOR1980 NOR1981 NOR1982 NOR1983 NOR1984 NOR1985
NOR1986
NOR1987 NOR1988 NOR1989 NOR1990 NOR1991 NOR1992 NOR1993 NOR1994 NOR1995 NOR1996 NOR1997 NOR1998
NOR1999 NOR2000
NOR2001 NOR2002 NOR2003 NOR2004 NOR2005 NPL1977 NPL1978 NPL1979 NPL1980 NPL1981 NPL1982 NPL1983 NPL1984 NPL1985 NPL1986 NPL1987 NPL1988 NPL1989 NPL1990 NPL1991 NPL1992 NPL1993 NPL1994 NPL1995 NPL1996 NPL1997 NPL1998 NPL1999 NPL2000 NPL2001 NPL2002 NPL2003 NPL2004 NPL2005
NZL1974
NZL1975 NZL1976 NZL1977 NZL1978 NZL1979 NZL1980 NZL1981 NZL1982 NZL1983
NZL1984















OMN2001 OMN2002 OMN2003 OMN2004
OMN2005








PAN1991 PAN1992 PAN1993 PAN1994 PAN1995
PAN1996 PAN1997 PAN1998 PAN1999 PAN2000 PAN2001 PAN2002 PAN2003 PAN2004 PAN2005 PER1978 PER1979
PER1980 PER1981 PER1982 PER1983 PER1984 PER1985
PER1986 PER1987 PER1988
PER1989
PER1990 PER1991 PER1992 PER1993 PER1994 PER1995 PER1996 PER1997 PER1998 PER1999 PER2000 PER2001 PER2002 PER2003 PER2004 PER2005 PHL1978 PHL1979 PHL1980 PHL1981 PHL1982 PHL1983 PHL1984 PHL1985 PHL1986 PHL1987 PHL1988 PHL1989 PHL1990 PHL1991 PHL1992 PHL1993 PHL1994 PHL1995 PHL1996 PHL1997 PHL1998
PHL1999 PHL2000 PHL2001 PHL2002 PHL2003 PHL2004 PHL2005 PRT1976 PRT1977 PRT1978 PRT1979 PRT1980 PRT1981
PRT1982 PRT1983 PRT1984 PRT1985 PRT1986 PRT1987 PRT1988 PRT1989 PRT1990 PRT1991 PRT1992 PRT1993 PRT1994 PRT1995 PRT1996 PRT1997 PRT1998 PRT1999 PRT2000 PRT2001 PRT2002 PRT2003 PRT2004 PRT2005 PRY1976 PRY1977 PRY1978 PRY1979 PRY1980 PRY1981 PRY1982 PRY1983 PRY1984 PRY1985 PRY1986 PRY1987
PRY1988 PRY1989
PRY1990
PRY1991 PRY1992 PRY1993 PRY1994 PRY1995 PRY1996 PRY1997
PRY1998 PRY1999 PRY2000 PRY2001 PRY2002 PRY2003 PRY2004 PRY2005 ROM1988 ROM1989
ROM1990
ROM1991 ROM1992 ROM1993 ROM1994 ROM1995 ROM1996 ROM1997 ROM1998 ROM1999 ROM2000 ROM2001 ROM2002 ROM2003 ROM2004 ROM2005 RWA1977
RWA1978
RWA1979
RWA1980 RWA1981 RWA1982 RWA1983 RWA1984 RWA1985 RWA1986 RWA1987 RWA1988 RWA1989 RWA1990 RWA1991 RWA1992 RWA1993 RWA1994
RWA1995









SAU1984 SAU1985 SAU1986 SAU1987 SAU1988 SAU1989 SAU1990
SAU1991
SAU1992 SAU1993 SAU1994 SAU1995 SAU1996 SAU1997 SAU1998
SAU1999 SAU2000
SAU2001 SAU2002 SAU2003 SAU2004 SAU2005
SDN1978 SDN1979 SDN1980 SDN1981
SDN1982 SDN1983 SDN1984 SDN1985 SDN1986 SDN1987 SDN1988 SDN1989 SDN1990 SDN1991 SDN1992 SDN1993
SDN1994 SDN1995 SDN1996 SDN1997 SDN1998 SDN1999 SDN2000 SDN2001 SDN2002 SDN2003 SDN2004
SDN2005 SEN1975 SEN1976 SEN1977
SEN1978 SEN1979 SEN1980 SEN1981
SEN1982
SEN1983 SEN1984 SEN1985 SEN1986 SEN1987 SEN1988 SEN1989 SEN1990 SEN1991 SEN1992 SEN1993 SEN1994 SEN1995 SEN1996 SEN1997 SEN1998 SEN1999 SEN2000 SEN2001 SEN2002 SEN2003 SEN2004
SGP1974
SGP1975 SGP1976 SGP1977 SGP1978 SGP1979 SGP1980
SGP1981 SGP1982 SGP1983 SGP1984 SGP1985 SGP1986 SGP1987
SGP1988 SGP1989 SGP1990 SGP1991 SGP1992 SGP1993
SGP1994 SGP1995 SGP1996 SGP1997 SGP1998 SGP1999 SGP2000 SGP2001 SGP2002
SGP2003 SGP2004 SGP2005








SLE1992 SLE1993 SLE1994 SLE1995 SLE1996
SLE1997 SLE1998















SWZ1999 SWZ2000 SWZ2001 SWZ2002 SWZ2003 SWZ2004 SWZ2005 SYR1978
SYR1979
SYR1980 SYR1981 SYR1982 SYR1983 SYR1984 SYR1985 SYR1986 SYR1987 SYR1988
SYR1989 SYR1990
SYR1991 SYR1992 SYR1993 SYR1994
SYR1995
SYR1996 SYR1997 SYR1998 SYR1999 SYR2000 SYR2001 SYR2002 SYR2003 SYR2004 SYR2005 TCD1978 TCD1979 TCD1980 TCD1981 TCD1982 TCD1983 TCD1984 TCD1985
TCD1986 TCD1987 TCD1988









TGO1985 TGO1986 TGO1987 TGO1988 TGO1989 TGO1990 TGO1991 TGO1992 TGO1993 TGO1994
TGO1995 TGO1996 TGO1997 TGO1998 TGO1999 TGO2000 TGO2001 TGO2002 TGO2003 TGO2004 THA1976 THA1977 THA1978 THA1979 THA1980 THA1981 THA1982
THA1983 THA1984 THA1985 THA1986 THA1987 THA1988 THA1989 THA1990 THA1991 THA1992 THA1993 THA1994 THA1995 THA1996 THA1997 THA1998














TTO2003 TTO2004 TUN1977 TUN1978 TUN1979 TUN1980 TUN1981 TUN1982 TUN1983 TUN1984 TUN1985 TUN1986 TUN1987 TUN1988 TUN1989 TUN1990 TUN1991 TUN1992 TUN1993 TUN1994 TUN1995 TUN1996 TUN1997 TUN1998 TUN1999 TUN2000 TUN2001 TUN2002 TUN2003 TUN2004 TUN2005 TUR1975 TUR1976 TUR1977 TUR1978 TUR1979 TUR1980 TUR1981 TUR1982 TUR1983 TUR1984 TUR1985 TUR1986 TUR1987 TUR1988 TUR1989 TUR1990 TUR1991 TUR1992 TUR1993
TUR1994
TUR1995 TUR1996 TUR1997 TUR1998 TUR1999 TUR2000
TUR2001
TUR2002 TUR2003 TUR2004 TUR2005 TZA1989 TZA1990 TZA1991 TZA1992 TZA1993
TZA1994 TZA1995 TZA1996 TZA1997 TZA1998 TZA1999 TZA2000 TZA2001 TZA2002 TZA2003 TZA2004 TZA2005
UGA1981
UGA1982 UGA1983 UGA1984
UGA1985 UGA1986 UGA1987 UGA1988 UGA1989 UGA1990 UGA1991 UGA1992 UGA1993 UGA1994 UGA1995 UGA1996 UGA1997 UGA1998 UGA1999 UGA2000 UGA2001 UGA2002 UGA2003 UGA2004 UGA2005 URY1979 URY1980 URY1981 URY1982 URY1983 URY1984 URY1985 URY1986 URY1987 URY1988 URY1989 URY1990 URY1991 URY1992 URY1993 URY1994 URY1995 URY1996 URY1997 URY1998 URY1999 URY2000 URY2001 URY2002 URY2003 URY2004 URY2005
VEN1974
















VEN2002 VEN2003 VEN2004 VEN2005
ZAF1974 ZAF1975 ZAF1976 ZAF1977 ZAF1978 ZAF1979 ZAF1980
ZAF1981




































































ARG1991 ARG1992 ARG1993 ARG1994
ARG1995











AUS1984 AUS1985 AUS1986 AUS1987
AUS1988 AUS1989
AUS1990 AUS1991 AUS1992 AUS1993
AUS1994 AUS1995 AUS1996 AUS1997
AUS1998 AUS1999
AUS2000 AUS2001






AUT1983 AUT1984 AUT1985 AUT1986 AUT1987 AUT1988 AUT1989 AUT1990 AUT1991 AUT1992 AUT1993 AUT1994 AUT1995 AUT1996 AUT1997 AUT1998 AUT1999 AUT2000 AUT2001 AUT2002

























BEL1987 BEL1988 BEL1989 BEL1990 BEL1991 BEL1992 BEL1993 BEL1994 BEL1995 BEL1996 BEL1997 BEL1998 BEL1999
BEL2000 BEL2001






















































BGD1990 BGD1991 BGD1992 BGD1993 BGD1994
BGD1995
BGD1996



































































BOL2004 BOL2005 BRA1976 BRA1977






BRA1989 BRA1990 BRA1991 BRA1992
BRA1993 BRA1994
BRA1995
BRA1996 BRA1997 BRA1998 BRA1999 BRA2000 BRA2001














































CAN1984 CAN1985 CAN1986 CAN1987 CAN1988 CAN1989
CAN1990 CAN1991 CAN1992 CAN1993 CAN1994 CAN1995 CAN1996
CAN1997
CAN1998 CAN1999 CAN2000






















































































































CRI1997 CRI1998 CRI1999 CRI2000 CRI2001
























DEU1975 DEU1976 DEU1977 DEU1978
DEU1979 DEU1980
DEU1981 DEU1982 DEU1983 DEU1984 DEU1985 DEU1986
DEU1987 DEU1988 DEU1989 DEU1990
DEU1991




























































































EGY1995 EGY1996 EGY1997 EGY1998










ESP1987 ESP1988 ESP1989 ESP1990 ESP1991 ESP1992
ESP1993

















































FRA1979 FRA1980 FRA1981 FRA1982
FRA1983 FRA1984 FRA1985 FRA1986 FRA1987 FRA1988 FRA1989 FRA1990 FRA1991 FRA1992 FRA1993 FRA1994 FRA1995 FRA1996 FRA1997 FRA1998 FRA1999
FRA2000
FRA2001




























GBR1975 GBR1976 GBR1977 GBR1978 GBR1979
GBR1980 GBR1981
GBR1982 GBR1983 GBR1984 GBR1985 GBR1986 GBR1987 GBR1988
GBR1989 GBR1990 GBR1991
GBR1992 GBR1993 GBR1994 GBR1995 GBR1996 GBR1997 GBR1998
GBR1999


















































































GTM1988 GTM1989 GTM1990 GTM1991
GTM1992
GTM1993 GTM1994 GTM1995 GTM1996
GTM1997 GTM1998















































































IND1978 IND1979 IND1980 IND1981 IND1982 IND1983 IND1984 IND1985 IND1986 IND1987 IND1988 IND1989 IND1990 IND1991 IND1992 IND1993 IND1994 IND1995 IND1996 IND1997 IND1998













IRL1990 IRL1991 IRL1992 IRL1993





















































ISR1993 ISR1994 ISR1995 ISR1996
ISR1997 ISR1998









ITA1987 ITA1988 ITA1989 ITA1990 ITA1991 ITA1992
ITA1993
ITA1994 ITA1995 ITA1996























































JPN1980 JPN1981 JPN1982 JPN1983 JPN1984 JPN1985 JPN1986





















































































































































MAR1991 MAR1992 MAR1993 MAR1994 MAR1995
MAR1996
MAR1997 MAR1998 MAR1999 MAR2000
MAR2001












































































































































































































































































































































































































PER2000 PER2001 PER2002 PER2003 PER2004 PER2005




















PRT1982 PRT1983 PRT1984 PRT1985 PRT1986
PRT1987 PRT1988
PRT1989




PRT1997 PRT1998 PRT1999 PRT2000 PRT2001 PRT2002 PRT2003
PRT2004 PRT2005
PRY1976 PRY1977
















































































































































































SLV1990 SLV1991 SLV1992 SLV1993 SLV1994
SLV1995












SWE1986 SWE1987 SWE1988 SWE1989 SWE1990
SWE1991
SWE1992














































































































































































































URY1991 URY1992 URY1993 URY1994














































ZAF1988 ZAF1989 ZAF1990 ZAF1991 ZAF1992 ZAF1993
ZAF1994 ZAF1995







































−.006 −.004 −.002 0 .002 .004
Fiscal Shock



























AUS1975 AUS1976 AUS1977 AUS1978 AUS1979
AUS1980 AUS1981
AUS1982










AUT1979 AUT1980 AUT1981 AUT1982
AUT1983 AUT1984 AUT1985 AUT1986 AUT1987 AUT1988 AUT1989 AUT1990 AUT1991 AUT1992 AUT1993 AUT1994 AUT1995 AUT1996 AUT1997 AUT1998 AUT1999 AUT2000








BEL1974 BEL1975 BEL1976 BEL1977 BEL1978 BEL1979
BEL1980
BEL1981
BEL1982 BEL1983 BEL1984 BEL1985 BEL1986 BEL1987
BEL1988 BEL1989 BEL1990


























BFA1999 BFA2000 BFA2001 BFA2002































BRA1990 BRA1991 BRA1992 BRA1993 BRA1994 BRA1995











CAF1982 CAF1983 CAF1984 CAF1985 CAF1986 CAF1987 CAF1988 CAF1989 CAF1990 CAF1991 CAN1974 CAN1975 CAN1976 CAN1977 CAN1978 CAN1979 CAN1980 CAN1981
CAN1982
CAN1983 CAN1984 CAN1985 CAN1986 CAN1987 CAN1988 CAN1989
CAN1990 CAN1991 CAN1992 CAN1993 CAN1994 CAN1995 CAN1996
CAN1997
CAN1998 CAN1999 CAN2000 CAN2001 CHE1974 CHE1975 CHE1976







































CMR1989 CMR1990 CMR1991 CMR1992
CMR1993
CMR1994 CMR1995 CMR1996 CMR1997 CMR1998 CMR1999 CMR2000 CMR2001 CMR2002 COL1974
COL1975









































DEU1976 DEU1977 DEU1978 DEU1979 DEU1980 DEU1981 DEU1982 DEU1983 DEU1984 DEU1985 DEU1986 DEU1987 DEU1988 DEU1989 DEU1990 DEU1991 DEU1992
DEU1993




DNK1982 DNK1983 DNK1984 DNK1985 DNK1986
DNK1987 DNK1988 DNK1989 DNK1990 DNK1991 DNK1992 DNK1993























DZA1974 DZA1975 DZA1976 DZA1977
DZA1978
DZA1979




















ECU1991 ECU1992 ECU1993 ECU1994






















ESP1975 ESP1976 ESP1977 ESP1978 ESP1979 ESP1980 ESP1981 ESP1982 ESP1983 ESP1984
ESP1985 ESP1986 ESP1987 ESP1988 ESP1989 ESP1990 ESP1991 ESP1992 ESP1993









ETH1994 ETH1995 ETH1996 ETH1997 ETH1998 ETH1999 ETH2000
ETH2001 ETH2002 FIN1974 FIN1975
FIN1976 FIN1977 FIN1978
FIN1979 FIN1980




FIN1995 FIN1996 FIN1997 FIN1998 FIN1999 FIN2000 FIN2001 FIN2002
FJI1974
FJI1975 FJI1976 FJI1977 FJI1978
FJI1979 FJI1980
FJI1981
FJI1982 FJI1983 FJI1984 FJI1985 FRA1974 FRA1975



















GAB2000 GAB2001 GAB2002 GBR1974 GBR1975 GBR1976 GBR1977 GBR1978 GBR1979 GBR1980 GBR1981
GBR1982 GBR1983 GBR1984 GBR1985 GBR1986 GBR1987 GBR1988 GBR1989 GBR1990 GBR1991 GBR1992 GBR1993 GBR1994 GBR1995 GBR1996 GBR1997 GBR1998




GHA1978 GHA1979 GHA1980 GHA1981 GHA1982 GHA1983 GHA1984 GHA1985







































































HKG1984 HKG1985 HKG1986 HKG1987 HKG1988 HKG1989 HKG1990 HKG1991 HKG1992 HKG1993










































IDN1985 IDN1986 IDN1987 IDN1988 IDN1989 IDN1990 IDN1991
IDN1992 IDN1993 IDN1994 IDN1995 IDN1996 IDN1997
IDN1998
IDN1999
IDN2000 IDN2001 IDN2002 IND1974
IND1975 IND1976 IND1977
IND1978 IND1979
IND1980 IND1981 IND1982 IND1983 IND1984 IND1985 IND1986 IND1987 IND1988 IND1989 IND1990
IND1991 IND1992 IND1993 IND1994 IND1995







IRL1982 IRL1983 IRL1984 IRL1985 IRL1986 IRL1987 IRL1988 IRL1989 IRL1990
IRL1991 IRL1992 IRL1993









IRN1985 IRN1986 IRN1987 IRN1988
IRN1989 IRN1990
IRN1991
IRN1992 IRN1993 IRN1994 IRN1995 IRN1996 IRN1997 IRN1998





















ITA1975 ITA1976 ITA1977 ITA1978 ITA1979 ITA1980 ITA1981 ITA1982 ITA1983 ITA1984 ITA1985 ITA1986 ITA1987 ITA1988 ITA1989 ITA1990 ITA1991 ITA1992
ITA1993






















JPN1975 JPN1976 JPN1977 JPN1978 JPN1979 JPN1980 JPN1981 JPN1982 JPN1983 JPN1984 JPN1985 JPN1986 JPN1987 JPN1988 JPN1989 JPN1990 JPN1991 JPN1992 JPN1993 JPN1994 JPN1995 JPN1996 JPN1997 JPN1998 JPN1999 JPN2000 JPN2001 KEN1980 KEN1981
KEN1982
KEN1983 KEN1984 KEN1985
KEN1986 KEN1987 KEN1988 KEN1989 KEN1990 KEN1991
KEN1992















KOR2001 KOR2002 LAO1985 LAO1986 LAO1987 LAO1988













































































MAR1999 MAR2000 MAR2001 MAR2002 MDG1974 MDG1975


















MEX1996 MEX1997 MEX1998 MEX1999 MEX2000









































































































































NIC1994 NIC1995 NIC1996 NIC1997 NIC1998
NIC1999
NIC2000 NIC2001 NIC2002 NLD1974 NLD1975 NLD1976
NLD1977 NLD1978 NLD1979 NLD1980




NOR1979 NOR1980 NOR1981 NOR1982 NOR1983 NOR1984 NOR1985
NOR1986
NOR1987 NOR1988 NOR1989 NOR1990
NOR1991 NOR1992 NOR1993 NOR1994 NOR1995 NOR1996 NOR1997 NOR1998
NOR1999 NOR2000 NOR2001 NOR2002
NZL1974
NZL1975 NZL1976 NZL1977 NZL1978 NZL1979 NZL1980
NZL1981
NZL1982 NZL1983 NZL1984 NZL1985
NZL1986
NZL1987 NZL1988 NZL1989 NZL1990
NZL1991
NZL1992
NZL1993 NZL1994 NZL1995 NZL1996 NZL1997 NZL1998
NZL1999
NZL2000 NZL2001 NZL2002
PAK1974 PAK1975 PAK1976 PAK1977 PAK1978 PAK1979 PAK1980 PAK1981

































PER1999 PER2000 PER2001 PER2002
PHL1974
PHL1975 PHL1976

















PRT1989 PRT1990 PRT1991 PRT1992
PRT1993 PRT1994 PRT1995 PRT1996
PRT1997 PRT1998 PRT1999 PRT2000 PRT2001
PRY1974 PRY1975





PRY1984 PRY1985 PRY1986 PRY1987 PRY1988 PRY1989 PRY1990 PRY1991
PRY1992


























SDN1988 SDN1989 SDN1990 SDN1991 SDN1997 SDN1998
SDN1999 SDN2000
SDN2001
SEN1974 SEN1975 SEN1976 SEN1977 SEN1978 SEN1979 SEN1980 SEN1981
SEN1982 SEN1983 SEN1984 SEN1985






















SLE1992 SLE1993 SLE1994 SLE1995 SLE1996
SLE1997 SLE1998 SLE1999





SLV1981 SLV1982 SLV1983 SLV1984 SLV1985 SLV1986 SLV1987 SLV1988 SLV1989 SLV1990
SLV1991 SLV1992 SLV1993 SLV1994 SLV1995
SLV1996
SLV1997 SLV1998
SLV1999 SLV2000 SLV2001 SLV2002 SWE1974 SWE1975 SWE1976 SWE1977 SWE1978
SWE1979 SWE1980 SWE1981 SWE1982 SWE1983 SWE1984 SWE1985 SWE1986 SWE1987 SWE1988 SWE1989
SWE1990 SWE1991 SWE1992 SWE1993







































































THA1992 THA1993 THA1994 THA1995 THA1996
THA1997
THA1998












































TZA1999 TZA2000 TZA2001 TZA2002 UGA1983 UGA1984 UGA1985 UGA1986
UGA1987 UGA1988






































ZAF1976 ZAF1977 ZAF1978 ZAF1979
ZAF1980 ZAF1981
ZAF1982 ZAF1983 ZAF1984 ZAF1985
ZAF1986
ZAF1987
ZAF1988 ZAF1989 ZAF1990 ZAF1991 ZAF1992 ZAF1993 ZAF1994 ZAF1995 ZAF1996 ZAF1997 ZAF1998







ZAR1983 ZAR1984 ZAR1985 ZAR1986 ZAR1987 ZAR1988 ZAR1989
ZAR1990 ZAR1991























































































































AUT1986 AUT1987 AUT1988 AUT1989 AUT1990 AUT1991
AUT1992 AUT1993




















BEL1984 BEL1985 BEL1986 BEL1987
BEL1988 BEL1989 BEL1990
BEL1991
BEL1992 BEL1993 BEL1994 BEL1995 BEL1996































BFA1999 BFA2000 BFA2001 BFA2002
























































































































































































































DEU1976 DEU1977 DEU1978 DEU1979
DEU1980
DEU1981 DEU1982
DEU1983 DEU1984 DEU1985 DEU1986 DEU1987 DEU1988 DEU1989 DEU1990 DEU1991 DEU1992
DEU1993
DEU1994
















































































































ESP1976 ESP1977 ESP1978 ESP1979
ESP1980 ESP1981 ESP1982 ESP1983 ESP1984




















































FRA1977 FRA1978 FRA1979 FRA1980
FRA1981 FRA1982 FRA1983 FRA1984 FRA1985 FRA1986 FRA1987 FRA1988 FRA1989 FRA1990
FRA1991 FRA1992
FRA1993






















GAB2001 GAB2002 GBR1974 GBR1975 GBR1976 GBR1977 GBR1978 GBR1979
GBR1980 GBR1981






GBR1992 GBR1993 GBR1994 GBR1995 GBR1996 GBR1997
GBR1998

























GIN1989 GIN1990 GIN1991 GIN1992
GIN1993 GIN1994









































GRC1988 GRC1989 GRC1990 GRC1991
GRC1992 GRC1993 GRC1994


































































































































































IRN1992 IRN1993 IRN1994 IRN1995 IRN1996
IRN1997
IRN1998





























ITA1984 ITA1985 ITA1986 ITA1987 ITA1988 ITA1989 ITA1990 ITA1991 ITA1992
ITA1993
ITA1994


















































KEN1993 KEN1994 KEN1995 KEN1996
KEN1997
KEN1998

































































































































































































































































































































































NLD1983 NLD1984 NLD1985 NLD1986
NLD1987
NLD1988 NLD1989 NLD1990 NLD1991 NLD1992 NLD1993




























































































































































































































































SLV1984 SLV1985 SLV1986 SLV1987 SLV1988 SLV1989
SLV1990
















































































































































































































































ZAF1990 ZAF1991 ZAF1992 ZAF1993



















































































−.006 −.004 −.002 0 .002 .004
Fiscal Shock
17Table 2: The Eﬀect of US ﬁscal shocks on investment and the current account
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CA CA weight INV INV weight
Fiscal Shock -1.630** -0.581* 1.250* 0.930
(0.486) (0.279) (0.594) (0.548)
Constant 0.010** 0.199*
(0.002) (0.084)
Observations 3002 2994 2588 2558
R-squared 0.003 0.001 0.129 0.058
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Investment regressions include a set of country dummies.
Standard errors clustered by year.
rent account is accomplished by a change in investment or savings abroad. Thus,
we might expect a coeﬃcient of roughly the same size (but opposite sign) for in-
vestment (since CA = S - I ) if there is no savings response but a smaller response
if savings moves.
Columns (3) and (4) of table 2 suggest that the current account shocks are
absorbed through changes to investment, not savings. The investment response is
always close to the absolute value of the current account response. A US ﬁscal
shock of one percent of non-US world GDP is accompanied by roughly the same
size increase in investment abroad. As with the current account regressions, the
coeﬃcient for the unweighted regression is larger than the weighted regression, but
the gap is not substantial.
A slightly diﬀerent way to look at the same question is directly through the
current account. Table 3 shows the result of using the exogenous ﬁscal shock as an
instrument for shocks to the current account. In columns (1) and (2) the change in
the current account as a percentage of own country GDP is regressed against the
changes in the US current account divided by GDP in the rest of the world. The US
current account change is instrumented with the exogenous ﬁscal shock. In columns
(3) and (4) the change in investment at the country year level is regressed against
the change in the current account at the country year level with the current account
change instrumented using the US ﬁscal shock.
Table 3 is similar to Table 2 with the coeﬃcients rescaled to more closely match
the accounting identities. Since the sum of the world’s current account must be zero,
we expect the coeﬃcient on the weighted regression in column (2) to be negative one.
18Table 3: The Eﬀect of Current Account Shocks - IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CA CA weight INV INV weight
US CA Change / World GDP -3.063** -1.137**
(1.067) (0.372)




Observations 3002 2994 2268 2266
R-squared 0.013
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Investment regressions include a set of country dummies.
Standard errors clustered by year.
For investment, a coeﬃcient of negative one in the weighted regressions indicates
that the current account shock is completely absorbed by investment with no change
in savings.14 These are roughly the values that we observe. For the average country
we see highly statistically signiﬁcant responses in the current account when US ﬁscal
shocks are used to instrument US current account movements. For the average
country we see statistically signiﬁcant responses in investment to domestic current
account movements that are caused by US ﬁscal shocks.
Exogenous ﬁscal shocks in the US appear to cause movements in the US cur-
rent account which cause changes to investment in the rest of the world. In the
next section we move to smaller samples of the data to examine whether there is
heterogeneity in how countries are aﬀected by the shock. In particular we will exam-
ine whether levels of development, currency regimes, or levels of ﬁnancial openness
aﬀect the size of the response to US ﬁscal shocks.
3.3 Does the Shock Aﬀect Countries Symmetrically?
Table 4 shows the results broken up by level of development where the advanced
countries are the original OECD countries, the emerging countries are the countries
14Note that the sign of the investment coeﬃcients is ﬂipped compared to the reduced form table
(2) because the right hand side variable is now the domestic current account. In table 2 the
coeﬃcients are the response of investment to a world savings shock. In table 3 the coeﬃcients
represent the response of investment to a domestic current account shock. These will run in
opposite directions.
19Table 4: Responses by Level of Development
Current Account
All Advanced Emerging Developing
Fiscal Shock -1.630** -0.775+ -1.471 -1.992**
(0.486) (0.448) (0.996) (0.582)
Observations 3002 651 600 1751
R-squared 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.003
Investment
All Advanced Emerging Developing
Fiscal Shock 1.250* 0.562 1.841* 1.329
(0.594) (0.530) (0.688) (0.853)
Observations 2588 634 534 1420
R-squared 0.129 0.024 0.049 0.148
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Investment regressions include a set of country dummies.
Standard errors clustered by year.
in the EMBI index along with much of Eastern Europe, and the developing counties
are all other countries.15 For the current account, the response to US ﬁscal shocks
appear to be decreasing in levels of development, though one cannot reject that
all three groups have identical coeﬃcients. For investment, the emerging group
appears to have the largest response, but again one cannot reject that all three
groups are identical. Perhaps more interesting than the pattern of results is the fact
that countries at all three levels of development have a signiﬁcant response to the
US shocks to world savings (signiﬁcant for the Advanced and Developing samples
for the current account and for the Emerging sample in investment) and that the
magnitudes of these results are very similar across levels of development. Initially,
one might think that large advanced nations have such deep capital markets that
outside ﬁscal shocks would be moot, but one must consider the global savings glut
argument that an increase in savings abroad aﬀects a country even as large and
ﬁnancially deep as the US. In that context, it may not be surprising that US shocks
spill across all types of nations.
Table 5 shows the results broken down by currency regime. The currency regime
is categorized across two dimensions. First, are countries dollar based or non-dollar
based and second, are they pegged or are they nonpegged. We use the coding
from Shambaugh (2004) for both measures. The base country is the country to
15See table 7 in the appendix for a full list of countries in each category.
20which a nation pegs or if it is not pegged in a given year, the country to which it
pegs when it does peg. Given that nearly every country pegs at some point in the
sample, the base country is directly revealed. In questionable cases, the history of
the currency and behavior of nearby countries can be used as a guide. Countries are
considered pegged if they stay within 2 percent bands against their base currency
throughout the year or if they have a perfectly ﬂat exchange rate except for a one
time devaluation.16
The results suggest that dollar based economies have a larger response to both
the current account and investment compared to non dollar based economies. Pegs
have a somewhat larger response than ﬂoats. Dollar based pegs have the largest
response for both variables and it is only for the dollar based countries that we can
reject no eﬀect. While this variation seems reasonable, none of these diﬀerences is
signiﬁcant. It may be that dollar based and dollar pegged countries are more tied
to the US capital market and hence feel the impact of US tax shocks more directly,
but in general, the coeﬃcients are within range of one another, so no deﬁnitive
statements can be made. The only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent coeﬃcient is that non-
dollar nonpegs show eﬀectively zero response in investment, but that coeﬃcient is
imprecisely estimated and we cannot reject zero or one or negative one for that
matter.
Table 6 shows the variation in responses across ﬁnancially open and closed
economies. In this table, we use the binary measure of the IMF’s annual year-
book to classify countries (aggregating the disaggregated measures into a binary
classiﬁcation after 1995 for continuity). Closed economies appear to have a larger
response in the current account but a smaller response to investment. The standard
errors are fairly high across groups leaving the diﬀerences insigniﬁcant. The results,
though, do not change substantially if one uses continuous measures developed by
Edwards or Chinn and Ito (2006)17 to divide countries into groups. It seems odd
that even countries that nominally have capital controls are aﬀected by changes in
US tax policy, but few countries with capital controls truly shut oﬀ access to capital
markets. Instead, they tend to temper price signals or simply slow capital ﬂows. In
fact, a number of studies suggest that capital controls do not substantially alter the
16See Klein and Shambaugh (2009) for an extensive discussion of the diﬀerent ways to code a
country’s exchange rate regime.
17Also see Chinn and Ito (2008).
21Table 5: Responses by Currency Regime
(1) (2) (3)




Fiscal Shock -1.630** -1.844** -1.283*
(0.486) (0.639) (0.622)
Observations 3002 1851 1151
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.002
Pegs
Fiscal Shock -1.837* -2.032+ -1.614
(0.728) (1.172) (0.968)
Observations 1298 658 640
R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.002
Non Pegs
Fiscal Shock -1.436* -1.727* -0.788
(0.670) (0.786) (0.535)
Observations 1701 1193 508
R-squared 0.004 0.005 0.003
Investment
All
Fiscal Shock 1.250* 1.735* 0.535
(0.594) (0.733) (0.803)
Observations 2588 1564 1024
R-squared 0.129 0.051 0.199
Pegs
Fiscal Shock 1.419+ 1.848* 1.043
(0.745) (0.808) (1.211)
Observations 1046 513 533
R-squared 0.206 0.137 0.232
Non Pegs
Fiscal Shock 1.066 1.587+ 0.046
(0.630) (0.812) (0.717)
Observations 1542 1051 491
R-squared 0.074 0.079 0.066
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Investment regressions include country dummies.
Standard errors clustered by year.
22Table 6: Responses by Financial Openness
Current Account
All Open Closed
Fiscal Shock -1.630** -0.726 -2.048**
(0.486) (0.995) (0.568)
Observations 3002 749 2068
R-squared 0.003 0.001 0.005
Investment
All Open Closed
Fiscal Shock 1.250* 1.564* 1.019+
(0.594) (0.706) (0.598)
Observations 2588 729 1859
R-squared 0.129 0.091 0.153
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Investment regressions include country dummies.
Standard errors clustered by year.
volume of capital ﬂows for a country (though they may alter the composition).18 In
that context, we may not be surprised to see similar responses across diﬀerent types
of ﬁnancial openness measures.
In fact, all that is needed to have symmetric responses across diﬀerent country
types is marginal lending from world markets and similar elasticities of investment
with regards to world interest rates across countries. This is consistent with the
conclusion of Caselli and Feyrer (2007) which shows that ﬁnancial returns to capital
are roughly equalized across countries. If returns are equalized at the margin, this
suggests that shocks should transmit across all countries in a similar fashion. This
is largely what we observe.
4 Conclusion
This paper takes a straightforward approach to examining the transmission of ﬁscal
shocks across borders using accounting identities. We view changes in tax policy as
a change in government savings. Assuming that change in savings is not entirely
oﬀset by either private savings or investment, the current account should respond
18See for example, a number of papers in the book Edwards (2007). In particular, the chapters
by Magud and Reinhart (2007) makes the point directly, but other country studies suggest the
same result.
23to such a shock. If the home current account changes, the foreign must as well.
A tax shock in one country should therefore lead to changes in either savings or
investment (or both) in other countries.
Using exogenous tax policy shocks in the US developed by Romer and Romer
(2009b), we ﬁnd that when US taxes increase, a substantial (roughly half) portion of
that increase in savings is transmitted to the current account. That increase in the
US current account is mirrored in a current account deﬁcit abroad. There appears
to be little change in foreign savings. Instead, investment abroad moves nearly one
for one with the current account. Thus, ﬁscal contraction through tax increases may
lead to increased investment abroad. The result is novel both in itself and due to
the approach through which it is reached. Due to the intertwined nature of savings
and investment around the globe, previous work studying the change in savings in
one country has not been able to identify the impact on other countries’ investment.
One might expect that if a large country increased taxes, that ﬁscal contraction
may act as a drag on the world economy. But, if that increase in savings also
increases investment in other countries, such an eﬀect may be mitigated. In a
domestic context, we tend to think one reason a tax cut does not purely crowd out
investment is the ability to borrow from abroad. In the global context, though, the
world economy is closed, so a change in taxes has a substantial impact on investment.
Along the way to this important result, the paper has implications for a number
of important theories. The fact that a tax policy change aﬀects the US current
account suggests that neither Ricardian equivalence nor the Feldstein Horioka result
hold completely. Our results also suggest that the notion of twin deﬁcits appears
sensible despite some recent econometric evidence to the contrary. Most of all,
though, our results suggest that savings shocks in one country aﬀect investment
around the globe.
The implications for today’s world are important. According to these results,
tax cuts in one country will lower the pool of savings available for investment around
the globe. We caution that our identiﬁcation is from tax changes that are exogenous
with respect to current economic conditions under the assumption of output at the
natural rate. This is clearly not the case with ﬁscal policy in the ﬁrst half of 2009.
It may be that the short run response to changes in ﬁscal policy is very diﬀerent
in periods of slack aggregate demand compared to an economy operating at the
natural rate of output. Ultimately, however, the economy will be operating at or
24near the natural rate and the accounting identities continue to hold.
25Table 7: List of Countries by Level of Development
Advanced Emerging Developing
Australia Argentina Afghanistan Gambia, The Neth. Antilles
Austria Brazil Algeria Ghana Nicaragua
Belgium Chile Angola Guatemala Niger
Canada Colombia Bahamas, The Guinea Nigeria
Denmark Egypt Bahrain Guyana Oman
Finland Hong Kong Bangladesh Haiti Panama
France India Barbados Honduras Paraguay
Germany Indonesia Benin Iran Qatar
Greece Israel Bolivia Jamaica Romania
Iceland Korea, Rep. Burkina Faso Jordan Rwanda
Ireland Malaysia Burundi Kenya Senegal
Italy Mexico Cameroon Lao PDR Sierra Leone
Japan Pakistan Central Afr Rep. Lebanon Sri Lanka
Luxembourg Peru Chad Lesotho Sudan
Netherlands Philippines Congo, Dem. Rep. Liberia Swaziland
New Zealand Saudi Arabia Costa Rica Libya Syrian Arab Rep
Norway Singapore Cote d’Ivoire Madagascar Tanzania
Portugal South Africa Cyprus Malawi Togo
Spain Thailand Dominican Rep. Mali Trinidad & Tobago
Sweden Turkey Ecuador Malta Tunisia
Switzerland Venezuela El Salvador Mauritania Uganda
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